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_____________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_____________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard Fahie appeals his convictions and requests a new trial. Fahie argues that 
his attorney provided ineffective assistance, and he contends that the Superior Court 
erroneously admitted certain testimony. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.  
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
On April 9, 2005, Patrick Benjamin was shot near the Tau Club in the Smith Bay 
area of St. Thomas. Officer Earl Mills was dispatched to the scene of the shooting. When 
he arrived, Mills observed Benjamin on the ground, lying in blood. Benjamin was taken 
to the hospital and treated by Dr. Sidney Commissiong for gunshot wounds in his left 
shoulder, left hand, and back.  
Detective Joel Dowdye visited Benjamin in the hospital and interviewed him 
about the shooting. Dowdye later provided Benjamin a photo array of six faces from 
which Benjamin identified Fahie as the shooter. Fahie was subsequently arrested.  
The government filed a five-count Information against Fahie, which was later 
amended. Count One charged Fahie with attempted first degree murder, in violation of 14 
V.I.C. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), and 331. Count Two charged Fahie with carrying an unlicensed 
firearm during the attempted commission of a first degree murder, in violation of 14 
V.I.C. §§ 2253(a), 921, 922(a)(a), and 331. Count Three charged Fahie with first degree 
assault, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 295(1). Count Four charged Fahie with carrying an 
  
unlicensed firearm during the commission of a first degree assault, in violation of 14 
V.I.C. §§ 2253(a) and 295(1). Finally, Count Five charged Fahie with possession of 
ammunition, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2256(a).  
The case proceeded to trial, during which the government presented testimony 
from Mills, Dowdye, Commissiong, and Benjamin. Both Mills and Dowdye testified that, 
on multiple occasions, Benjamin identified Fahie as the shooter. Benjamin himself 
testified that, after he was shot, he yelled, “Richard Fahie from Bordeaux shot me.” J.A. 
90. After a two-day trial, the jury found Fahie guilty on Counts One, Two, Three, and 
Four of the amended Information. The jury found Fahie not guilty on Count Five.  
Fahie appealed to the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands. He asserted that his attorney provided ineffective assistance. He also argued that 
the Superior Court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony by Mills, Dowdye, Benjamin, 
and Commissiong and character testimony by Benjamin. The Appellate Division declined 
to address Fahie’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In pertinent part, the Appellate 
Division explained that “the record is inadequate for a comprehensive inquiry into the 
strategy and tactics behind counsel’s decisions not to object to evidence introduced by the 
People or present alibi evidence.” J.A. 12. With respect to the challenged evidence, the 
Appellate Division held that the hearsay testimony fell within Section 932(1) of the 
Virgin Islands Code and that the admission of Benjamin’s character testimony did not 
amount to plain error. Fahie now appeals.
1
  
                                                 
1
 The Appellate Division had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1613a(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). “Because ineffective 
  
II. Analysis 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 On appeal, Fahie renews his argument that his attorney provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and he contends that the record is adequate for us to address this 
claim on direct appeal.  
“It has long been the practice of this court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel to a collateral attack.” United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 
2003). Our “refusal to entertain [ineffective assistance] claims on direct review stems 
from the reality that such claims frequently involve questions regarding conduct that 
occurred outside the purview of the [trial] court and therefore can be resolved only after a 
factual development at an appropriate hearing.” United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 
547, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A narrow exception 
to the rule against hearing ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal applies in rare 
circumstances “[w]here the record is sufficient to allow determination of ineffective 
assistance of counsel” and “an evidentiary hearing to develop the facts is not needed.” 
United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991). However, Fahie’s 
challenge does not “fit[] into that narrow class of ineffectiveness claims amenable to 
review on direct appeal.” McLaughlin, 386 F.3d at 556. The record before us is 
insufficient to address Fahie’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because we cannot 
                                                                                                                                                             
assistance of counsel claims present mixed questions of law and fact, our review is 
plenary.” United States v. Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 187 (3d Cir. 1997). We review for 
plain error the Superior Court’s decision to admit evidence in the absence of an objection 
to its admissibility. See United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2007). 
  
discern if his attorney’s performance was due to trial strategy or ineffectiveness. 
Therefore, we affirm the Appellate Division’s decision not to entertain Fahie’s ineffective 
assistance claim on direct appeal.  
B. Benjamin’s Testimony  
 Fahie next argues that the Superior Court erroneously admitted Benjamin’s bad 
character testimony. In particular, Fahie challenges the admission of three statements that 
Benjamin made about Fahie. Benjamin testified that: (1) he was the victim of a prior 
unprovoked attack by Fahie, (2) Fahie always said, “He’s a wanted man he can do 
anything,” and (3) Fahie always said, “He hate Dominicans, he hate Antiguans, and he 
hate Jamaicans, he have to kill all of them.” J.A. 99-100. Because Fahie failed to object 
to the admission of these statements at trial, we apply plain error review. 
To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate “that the error was clear or 
obvious under current law” and “affected the outcome of the trial.” Rivas, 493 F.3d at 
136. Assuming, without deciding, that Benjamin’s three remarks were inadmissible, the 
Superior Court did not commit plain error because this testimony did not affect the 
outcome of Fahie’s trial. As the Appellate Division correctly noted, Benjamin’s 
“statements did not comprise the heart of [his] testimony, nor did they play a particularly 
important role in the People’s case.” J.A. 16. Given the overwhelming evidence against 
Fahie, the outcome of the case would have been the same regardless of Benjamin’s 
testimony about Fahie’s past conduct. Therefore, we conclude that the admission of 
Benjamin’s statements did not amount to plain error.   
 
  
C. Commissiong’s Testimony  
 Finally, Fahie argues that Commissiong’s testimony that “[Benjamin] said he 
knew who shot him” should have been excluded because it was irrelevant and 
inadmissible hearsay.
2
 J.A. 60. Because Fahie failed to object to the admission of 
Commissiong’s testimony at trial, we review his challenge for plain error.  
 Section 771(2) of the Virgin Islands Code broadly defines “relevant evidence” as 
“evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.” 5 V.I.C § 771(2).3 
Commissiong’s testimony was relevant because it helped corroborate the credibility of 
Benjamin’s identification of Fahie as the shooter.  
Moreover, Commissiong’s testimony fell within a hearsay exception. Hearsay is 
defined as “a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the 
hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” 5 V.I.C § 932. While hearsay 
testimony is generally inadmissible, Section 932(1) of the Virgin Islands Code permits 
the use of a statement “previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and 
available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter.” 5 
V.I.C § 932(1). Here, Commissiong testified about a statement previously made by 
                                                 
2
 On appeal, Fahie appears to have abandoned his previous hearsay challenges to the 
testimony of Mills, Dowdye, and Benjamin. Therefore, we do not address these claims in 
our opinion. See New Jersey v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 640 F.3d 545, 547 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
3
 At the time of this case, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, codified as 5 V.I.C. §§ 771-
956, applied. See Phillips v. People, 2009 WL 707182, at *7 (V.I. Mar. 12, 2009); see 
3
 At the time of this case, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, codified as 5 V.I.C. §§ 771-
956, applied. See Phillips v. People, 2009 WL 707182, at *7 (V.I. Mar. 12, 2009); see 
also Chinnery v. Virgin Islands, 2011 WL 3490267, at *8 (V.I. May 27, 2011) 
(explaining that the Uniform Rules of Evidence were not repealed and replaced with the 
Federal Rules of Evidence until April 7, 2010).  
  
Benjamin, who was present at Fahie’s trial and available for cross-examination. 
Therefore, Commissiong’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s statement was admissible 
pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 932(1).  
Even if the Superior Court erred in admitting Commissiong’s testimony, it did not 
commit plain error because the testimony did not affect the outcome of Fahie’s trial. 
Commissiong’s statement occurred during the course of a two-day trial. Due to the 
overpowering evidence against Fahie, the result in this case would have been the same 
regardless of Commissiong’s testimony that “[Benjamin] said he knew who shot him.” 
J.A. 60. 
Given that Commissiong’s testimony was relevant, fell within a hearsay exception, 
and did not affect the outcome of the trial, the admission of this testimony did not 
constitute an error, let alone a plain error. 
III. Conclusion  
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment in all 
respects.  
